firefox-main/third_party/rust/neqo-transport/src/connection/tests/handshake.rs

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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
// except according to those terms.
#![allow(
clippy::missing_asserts_for_indexing,
clippy::unwrap_in_result,
reason = "OK in tests"
)]
use std::{
cell::RefCell,
net::{IpAddr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr},
rc::Rc,
time::Duration,
};
use neqo_common::{Datagram, event::Provider as _, qdebug};
use neqo_crypto::{
AuthenticationStatus, constants::TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, generate_ech_keys,
};
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
use test_fixture::datagram;
use test_fixture::{
DEFAULT_ADDR,
assertions::{assert_coalesced_0rtt, assert_handshake, assert_initial, assert_version},
damage_ech_config, fixture_init, now, split_datagram, strip_padding,
};
use super::{
super::{Connection, Output, State},
AT_LEAST_PTO, CountingConnectionIdGenerator, DEFAULT_RTT, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA, assert_error,
connect, connect_force_idle, connect_with_rtt, default_client, default_server, get_tokens,
handshake, maybe_authenticate, resumed_server, send_something, zero_len_cid_client,
};
use crate::{
CloseReason, ConnectionParameters, EmptyConnectionIdGenerator, Error, Pmtud, StreamType,
Version,
connection::{
AddressValidation,
tests::{exchange_ticket, new_client, new_server},
},
events::ConnectionEvent,
server::ValidateAddress,
stats::FrameStats,
tparams::{TransportParameter, TransportParameterId::*},
tracking::DEFAULT_LOCAL_ACK_DELAY,
};
const ECH_CONFIG_ID: u8 = 7;
const ECH_PUBLIC_NAME: &str = "public.example";
fn full_handshake(pmtud: bool) {
qdebug!("---- client: generate CH");
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().pmtud(pmtud));
let out = client.process_output(now());
let out2 = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some() && out2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
assert_eq!(out2.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
qdebug!("---- server: CH -> SH, EE, CERT, CV, FIN");
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().pmtud(pmtud));
server.process_input(out.dgram().unwrap(), now());
let out = server.process(out2.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), server.plpmtu());
qdebug!("---- client: cert verification");
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
assert!(maybe_authenticate(&mut client));
qdebug!("---- client: SH..FIN -> FIN");
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
qdebug!("---- server: FIN -> ACKS");
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
qdebug!("---- client: ACKS -> 0");
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
if pmtud {
// PMTUD causes a PING probe to be sent here
let pkt = out.dgram().unwrap();
assert!(pkt.len() > client.plpmtu());
} else {
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
}
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_no_pmtud() {
full_handshake(false);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_pmtud() {
full_handshake(true);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_failed_authentication() {
qdebug!("---- client: generate CH");
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process_output(now());
let out2 = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some() && out2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("---- server: CH -> SH, EE, CERT, CV, FIN");
let mut server = default_server();
server.process_input(out.dgram().unwrap(), now());
let out = server.process(out2.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("---- client: cert verification");
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = client.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
let authentication_needed = |e| matches!(e, ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded);
assert!(client.events().any(authentication_needed));
qdebug!("---- client: Alert(certificate_revoked)");
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::CertRevoked, now());
qdebug!("---- client: -> Alert(certificate_revoked)");
let out = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("---- server: Alert(certificate_revoked)");
let out = server.process(out.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_error(&client, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoAlert(44)));
assert_error(&server, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::Peer(300)));
}
#[test]
fn no_alpn() {
let mut client = default_client();
client.set_alpn(&["bad-alpn"]).unwrap();
let mut server = default_server();
handshake(&mut client, &mut server, now(), Duration::new(0, 0));
assert_error(&client, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::Peer(376)));
assert_error(&server, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoAlert(120)));
}
#[test]
fn dup_server_flight1() {
let mut client = default_client();
let c_hs_1 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let c_hs_2 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
assert!(c_hs_1.is_some() && c_hs_2.is_some());
assert_eq!(c_hs_1.as_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
assert_eq!(c_hs_2.as_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
let mut server = default_server();
server.process_input(c_hs_1.unwrap(), now());
let s_hs_1 = server.process(c_hs_2, now()).dgram().unwrap();
let s_hs_2 = server.process_output(now()).dgram().unwrap();
let s_hs_1 = strip_padding(s_hs_1);
let s_hs_2 = strip_padding(s_hs_2);
client.process_input(s_hs_1.clone(), now());
client.process_input(s_hs_2.clone(), now());
assert!(maybe_authenticate(&mut client));
let out = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
assert!(out.is_some());
let before = client.stats();
assert_eq!(0, before.dups_rx);
assert_eq!(0, before.dropped_rx);
// By now, the client should have dropped Initial keys.
// So it should drop any of those that it receives.
// We have three cases to cover:
// 1. s_hs_1 contains Initial and Handshake, s_hs_2 contains Handshake
// 2. s_hs_1 contains Initial, s_hs_2 contains Handshake
// 3. s_hs_1 contains Initial, s_hs_2 contains Initial and Handshake
client.process_input(s_hs_1, now());
let in_between = client.stats();
assert_eq!(1, in_between.dropped_rx);
assert!((0..=1).contains(&in_between.dups_rx));
client.process_input(s_hs_2, now());
let after = client.stats();
assert!((1..=2).contains(&after.dropped_rx));
// In cases 1 and 2, there is only one duplicated packet.
assert!(after.dropped_rx == 1 || after.dups_rx == 1);
assert_eq!(in_between.dups_rx + 1, after.dups_rx);
}
// Test that we split crypto data if they cannot fit into one packet.
// To test this we will use a long server certificate.
#[test]
fn crypto_frame_split() {
// This test has its own logic for generating large CRYPTO frames, so turn off MLKEM.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false));
let mut server = Connection::new_server(
test_fixture::LONG_CERT_KEYS,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
ConnectionParameters::default(),
)
.expect("create a server");
let client1 = client.process_output(now());
assert!(client1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// The entire server flight doesn't fit in a single packet because the
// certificate is large, therefore the server will produce 2 packets.
let server1 = server.process(client1.dgram(), now());
assert!(server1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let server2 = server.process_output(now());
assert!(server2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let client2 = client.process(server1.dgram(), now());
// This is an ack.
assert!(client2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// The client might have the certificate now, so we can't guarantee that
// this will work.
let auth1 = maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Handshaking);
// let server process the ack for the first packet.
let server3 = server.process(client2.dgram(), now());
assert!(server3.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
// Consume the second packet from the server.
let client3 = client.process(server2.dgram(), now());
// Check authentication.
let auth2 = maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
assert!(auth1 ^ auth2);
// Now client has all data to finish handshake.
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
let client4 = client.process(server3.dgram(), now());
// One of these will contain data depending on whether Authentication was completed
// after the first or second server packet.
assert!(client3.as_dgram_ref().is_some() ^ client4.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
drop(server.process(client3.dgram(), now()));
drop(server.process(client4.dgram(), now()));
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
/// Run a single ChaCha20-Poly1305 test and get a PTO.
#[test]
fn chacha20poly1305() {
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = zero_len_cid_client(DEFAULT_ADDR, DEFAULT_ADDR);
client.set_ciphers(&[TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256]).unwrap();
connect_force_idle(&mut client, &mut server);
}
/// Test that a server can send 0.5 RTT application data.
#[test]
fn send_05rtt() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let c1 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let c2 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some() && c2.is_some());
server.process_input(c1.unwrap(), now());
let s1 = server.process(c2, now()).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s1.len(), server.plpmtu());
// The server should accept writes at this point.
let s2 = send_something(&mut server, now());
// Complete the handshake at the client.
client.process_input(s1, now());
// The client should receive the 0.5-RTT data now.
client.process_input(s2, now());
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
let mut buf = vec![0; DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len() + 1];
let stream_id = client
.events()
.find_map(|e| {
if let ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { stream_id } = e {
Some(stream_id)
} else {
None
}
})
.unwrap();
let (l, ended) = client.stream_recv(stream_id, &mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&buf[..l], DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA);
assert!(ended);
}
/// Test that a client buffers 0.5-RTT data when it arrives early.
#[test]
fn reorder_05rtt() {
// This test makes too many assumptions about single-packet PTOs for multi-packet MLKEM flights
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false));
let mut server = default_server();
let c1 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some());
let s1 = server.process(c1, now()).dgram().unwrap();
// The server should accept writes at this point.
let s2 = send_something(&mut server, now());
// We can't use the standard facility to complete the handshake, so
// drive it as aggressively as possible.
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 0);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 0);
client.process_input(s2, now());
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 0);
// After processing the first packet, the client should go back and
// process the 0.5-RTT packet data, which should make data available.
client.process_input(s1, now());
// We can't use `maybe_authenticate` here as that consumes events.
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::Ok, now());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
let mut buf = vec![0; DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len() + 1];
let stream_id = client
.events()
.find_map(|e| {
if let ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { stream_id } = e {
Some(stream_id)
} else {
None
}
})
.unwrap();
let (l, ended) = client.stream_recv(stream_id, &mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&buf[..l], DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA);
assert!(ended);
}
#[test]
fn reorder_05rtt_with_0rtt() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let validation = AddressValidation::new(now(), ValidateAddress::NoToken).unwrap();
let validation = Rc::new(RefCell::new(validation));
server.set_validation(&validation);
let mut now = connect_with_rtt(&mut client, &mut server, now(), RTT);
// Include RTT in sending the ticket or the ticket age reported by the
// client is wrong, which causes the server to reject 0-RTT.
now += RTT / 2;
server.send_ticket(now, &[]).unwrap();
let ticket = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(ticket, now);
let token = get_tokens(&mut client).pop().unwrap();
// This test makes too many assumptions about what's in the packets to work with multi-packet
// MLKEM flights.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false));
client.enable_resumption(now, token).unwrap();
let mut server = resumed_server(&client);
// Send ClientHello and some 0-RTT.
let c1 = send_something(&mut client, now);
assert_coalesced_0rtt(&c1[..]);
// Drop the 0-RTT from the coalesced datagram, so that the server
// acknowledges the next 0-RTT packet.
let (c1, _) = split_datagram(&c1);
let c2 = send_something(&mut client, now);
// Handle the first packet and send 0.5-RTT in response. Drop the response.
now += RTT / 2;
drop(server.process(Some(c1), now).dgram().unwrap());
// The gap in 0-RTT will result in this 0.5 RTT containing an ACK.
server.process_input(c2, now);
let s2 = send_something(&mut server, now);
// Save the 0.5 RTT.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s2, now);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
// Now PTO at the client and cause the server to re-send handshake packets.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c3 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_coalesced_0rtt(c3.as_ref().unwrap());
now += RTT / 2;
let s3 = server.process(c3, now).dgram().unwrap();
// The client should be able to process the 0.5 RTT now.
// This should contain an ACK, so we are processing an ACK from the past.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s3, now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c4 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
assert_eq!(client.paths.rtt(), RTT);
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c4.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
// Don't check server RTT as it will be massively inflated by a
// poor initial estimate received when the server dropped the
// Initial packet number space.
}
/// Test that a server that coalesces 0.5 RTT with handshake packets
/// doesn't cause the client to drop application data.
#[test]
fn coalesce_05rtt() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
// The first exchange doesn't offer a chance for the server to send.
// So drop the server flight and wait for the PTO.
let c1 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let c11 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some() && c11.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c1.unwrap(), now);
let s1 = server.process(c11, now).dgram();
assert!(s1.is_some());
// Drop the server flight. Then send some data.
let stream_id = server.stream_create(StreamType::UniDi).unwrap();
assert!(server.stream_send(stream_id, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA).is_ok());
assert!(server.stream_close_send(stream_id).is_ok());
// Now after a PTO the client can send another packet.
// The server should then send its entire flight again,
// including the application data, which it sends in a 1-RTT packet.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c2_1 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let c2_2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c2_1.is_some() && c2_2.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c2_2.unwrap(), now);
let s2 = server.process(c2_1, now).dgram();
// s2 is just an Initial, which might be padded.
let dgram = client.process(s2.map(strip_padding), now).dgram();
// Padding was stripped, so a dropped packet would indicate a problem.
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
let s2 = server.process(dgram, now).dgram();
// The client should process the datagram. It can't process the 1-RTT
// packet until authentication completes though. So it saves it.
now += RTT / 2;
drop(client.process(s2, now).dgram());
// This packet will contain an ACK, but we can ignore it.
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 3);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
// After (successful) authentication, the packet is processed.
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c3 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c3.is_some());
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 4);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
client
.events()
.find(|e| matches!(e, ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { .. }))
.expect(" client not to drop 0.5 RTT coalesced application data");
// Allow the handshake to complete.
now += RTT / 2;
let s3 = server.process(c3, now).dgram();
assert!(s3.is_some());
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
now += RTT / 2;
drop(client.process(s3, now).dgram());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
// The client should never have received padding.
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
}
#[test]
fn reorder_handshake() {
const V2_INITIAL: u8 = 0b1001_0000;
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
// Disable packet number randomization for deterministic packet counts.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().randomize_first_pn(false));
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().randomize_first_pn(false));
let mut now = now();
let c1 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let c2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some() && c2.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c1.unwrap(), now);
let _s_initial = server.process(c2, now).dgram().unwrap();
let s_handshake_1 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
let s_hs1_has_initial = s_handshake_1[0] & 0b1011_0000 == V2_INITIAL;
// Pass just the handshake packet in and the client can't handle it yet.
// It can only send another Initial packet.
now += RTT + RTT / 2; // With multi-packet MLKEM flights, client needs more time here.
let dgram = client.process(Some(s_handshake_1), now).dgram();
assert_initial(dgram.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, usize::from(s_hs1_has_initial));
// Get the server to try again.
// Though we currently allow the server to arm its PTO timer, use
// a second client Initial packet to cause it to send again.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
now += RTT / 2;
// When Handshake PTO fires, Initial packets are also marked for retransmission.
// The server sends three Initial datagrams, then a Handshake datagram.
let s_pkt_tx_before = server.stats().packets_tx;
let s_initial_2 = server.process(c2, now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_initial(&s_initial_2, false);
let s_initial_3 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_initial(&s_initial_3, false);
let s_initial_4 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_initial(&s_initial_4, false);
// Count the number of packets sent, so we can account for any Handshake packets.
let s_pkt_tx = server.stats().packets_tx - s_pkt_tx_before;
let s_handshake_2 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
let s_hs2_has_initial = s_handshake_2[0] & 0b1011_0000 == V2_INITIAL;
// Processing the Handshake packet first should save it.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s_handshake_2, now);
let c_stats_before = client.stats();
assert_eq!(c_stats_before.saved_datagrams, 2);
// There's a chance that each "handshake" datagram contained a little bit of an Initial packet.
// That will have been processed by the client.
assert_eq!(
c_stats_before.packets_rx,
usize::from(s_hs1_has_initial) + usize::from(s_hs2_has_initial)
);
assert!(c_stats_before.dropped_rx == 0);
// Deliver all Initial packets.
client.process_input(s_initial_2, now);
client.process_input(s_initial_3, now);
client.process_input(s_initial_4, now);
// The client should have received and processed `s_pkt_tx`,
// plus the two saved datagrams that were saved
// and any garbage that was dropped.
let c_stats_after = client.stats();
assert_eq!(
c_stats_after.packets_rx - c_stats_before.packets_rx,
s_pkt_tx + 2 + c_stats_after.dropped_rx
);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c3 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c3.is_some());
// Note that though packets were saved and processed very late,
// they don't cause the RTT to change.
now += RTT / 2;
let s3 = server.process(c3, now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
// Don't check server RTT estimate as it will be inflated due to
// it making a guess based on retransmissions when it dropped
// the Initial packet number space.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s3.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(client.paths.rtt(), RTT);
}
/// When a compatible version upgrade occurs, the server needs to handle
/// Initial packets from both versions. Check that it doesn't drop them,
/// which would be recoverable, but wasteful.
#[test]
fn interleave_versions_server() {
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().versions(
Version::Version1,
vec![Version::Version2, Version::Version1],
));
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c1 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let c2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some() && c2.is_some());
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let cspare = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_version(cspare.as_ref().unwrap(), Version::Version1.wire_version());
assert_initial(cspare.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
server.process_input(c1.unwrap(), now);
let s1 = server.process(c2, now).dgram().unwrap();
let s2 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
client.process_input(s1, now);
client.process_input(s2, now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let chandshake = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_version(
chandshake.as_ref().unwrap(),
Version::Version2.wire_version(),
);
// Now send in the v2 and v1 packets out of order.
// Both should be accepted, even though the version is now set to v2.
assert!(server.has_version());
assert_eq!(server.version(), Version::Version2);
let before = server.stats();
server.process_input(chandshake.unwrap(), now);
let after = server.stats();
assert!(before.packets_rx < after.packets_rx); // Some number of packets went in.
assert_eq!(before.dropped_rx, after.dropped_rx); // None were dropped.
let before = server.stats();
server.process_input(cspare.unwrap(), now);
let after = server.stats();
assert!(before.packets_rx < after.packets_rx); // Some number of packets went in.
assert_eq!(before.dropped_rx + 1, after.dropped_rx); // This packet was padded, so we drop 1.
let done = server.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
client.process_input(done.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
/// When a compatible version upgrade occurs, the client also needs to handle
/// Initial packets from both versions.
#[test]
fn interleave_versions_client() {
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().versions(
Version::Version1,
vec![Version::Version2, Version::Version1],
));
let mut server = default_server();
let now = now();
let c1 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let c2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some() && c2.is_some());
// The server will ACK the packet, but that's it.
let s1 = server.process(c1, now).dgram();
assert_initial(s1.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
assert_version(s1.as_ref().unwrap(), Version::Version1.wire_version());
assert!(!server.has_version());
// Once it has all the packets the server can choose a version.
let s2 = server.process(c2, now).dgram();
assert_initial(s2.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
assert_version(s2.as_ref().unwrap(), Version::Version2.wire_version());
assert!(server.has_version());
// Receiving the first packet (no CRYPTO) doesn't set the version.
client.process_input(s1.unwrap(), now);
let client_stats = client.stats();
assert_eq!(client_stats.packets_rx, 1); // Just an Initial packet for now.
assert_eq!(client_stats.frame_rx.crypto, 0); // No CRYPTO
assert!(!client.has_version());
// The second does.
client.process_input(s2.unwrap(), now);
let s3 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
if s3[0] & 0b1011_0000 == 0b1001_0000 {
// The Initial (v2!) spilled over into another datagram.
let (extra, _) = split_datagram(&s3);
client.process_input(extra, now);
}
assert!(client.has_version());
assert_eq!(client.version(), Version::Version2);
// Let the server finish its handshake.
client.process_input(s3, now);
// The client finishes with v2 packets.
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let chandshake = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_version(
chandshake.as_ref().unwrap(),
Version::Version2.wire_version(),
);
let done = server.process(chandshake, now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
client.process_input(done.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[test]
fn reorder_1rtt() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
const PACKETS: usize = 4; // Many, but not enough to overflow cwnd.
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c1 = client.process_output(now).dgram().map(strip_padding);
let c2 = client.process_output(now).dgram().map(strip_padding);
assert!(c1.is_some() && c2.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c1.unwrap(), now);
let s1 = server.process(c2, now).dgram().map(strip_padding);
assert!(s1.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
let dgram = client.process(s1, now).dgram().map(strip_padding);
now += RTT / 2;
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now).dgram().map(strip_padding);
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c2 = client.process_output(now).dgram().map(strip_padding);
assert!(c2.is_some());
// Now get a bunch of packets from the client.
// Give them to the server before giving it `c2`.
for _ in 0..PACKETS {
let d = send_something(&mut client, now);
server.process_input(strip_padding(d), now + RTT / 2);
}
// The server has now received those packets, and saved them.
// It has only been given the three handshake packets we gave it.
assert_eq!(server.stats().packets_rx, 3);
assert_eq!(server.stats().saved_datagrams, PACKETS);
assert_eq!(server.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
now += RTT / 2;
let s2 = server.process(c2, now).dgram();
// The server has now received those packets, and saved them.
// The two additional are an Initial w/ACK, a Handshake w/ACK and a 1-RTT (w/
// NEW_CONNECTION_ID).
assert!(server.stats().packets_rx > PACKETS);
assert_eq!(server.stats().saved_datagrams, PACKETS);
assert_eq!(server.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(server.paths.rtt(), RTT);
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s2.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(client.paths.rtt(), RTT);
// All the stream data that was sent should now be available.
let streams = server
.events()
.filter_map(|e| {
if let ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { stream_id } = e {
Some(stream_id)
} else {
None
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(streams.len(), PACKETS);
for stream_id in streams {
let mut buf = vec![0; DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len() + 1];
let (recvd, fin) = server.stream_recv(stream_id, &mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(recvd, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len());
assert!(fin);
}
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
#[test]
fn corrupted_initial() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let d = client.process_output(now()).dgram().unwrap();
let mut corrupted = Vec::from(&d[..]);
// Find the last non-padding value and corrupt that.
let (idx, _) = corrupted
.iter()
.enumerate()
.rev()
.skip(1) // Skip the last byte, which might be a SCONE indicator.
.find(|&(_, &v)| v != Connection::SCONE_INDICATION[0]) // The SCONE padding value.
.unwrap();
corrupted[idx] ^= 0x76;
let dgram = Datagram::new(d.source(), d.destination(), d.tos(), corrupted);
server.process_input(dgram, now());
// The server should have received two "packets", both corrupted.
assert_eq!(server.stats().packets_rx, 2);
assert_eq!(server.stats().dropped_rx, 2);
}
#[test]
// Absent path PTU discovery, max v6 packet size should be PATH_MTU_V6.
fn verify_pkt_honors_mtu() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
connect_force_idle(&mut client, &mut server);
let now = now();
let cb = client.process_output(now).callback();
assert_eq!(cb, ConnectionParameters::DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
// Try to send a large stream and verify first packet is correctly sized
let stream_id = client.stream_create(StreamType::UniDi).unwrap();
assert_eq!(client.stream_send(stream_id, &[0xbb; 2000]).unwrap(), 2000);
let pkt0 = client.process_output(now);
assert!(matches!(pkt0, Output::Datagram(_)));
assert_eq!(pkt0.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
}
#[test]
fn extra_initial_hs() {
// Disable MLKEM here because we need to have the client Initial in a single packet.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false));
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c_init = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c_init.is_some());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init = server.process(c_init, now).dgram().unwrap();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let (mut undecryptable, _) = split_datagram(&s_init);
assert_eq!(undecryptable[0] & 0x80, 0x80, "is long header packet");
// Turn the Initial packet from the server into a Handshake packet.
// It will be a badly formatted one, but the client will save it
// and send back an Initial each time.
undecryptable[0] += 0x20;
// Feed that undecryptable packet into the client a few times.
// Do that MAX_SAVED_DATAGRAMS times and each time the client will emit
// another Initial packet.
for _ in 0..crate::saved::SavedDatagrams::CAPACITY {
let c_init = match client.process(Some(undecryptable.clone()), now) {
Output::None => unreachable!(),
Output::Datagram(c_init) => Some(c_init),
Output::Callback(duration) => {
now += duration;
client.process_output(now).dgram()
}
};
assert_initial(c_init.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 10;
}
// After MAX_SAVED_DATAGRAMS, the client stops sending Initial packets.
// This is why we disable MLKEM: a large Initial would force the client
// to send two packets in response to each undecryptable packet.
// In that case, the client would still be probing the Initial space on PTO.
let nothing = client.process(Some(undecryptable), now);
assert!(nothing.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
// Until PTO, where another Initial can be used to complete the handshake.
now += nothing.callback();
let c_init = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_initial(c_init.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init = server.process(c_init, now).dgram();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s_init.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c_fin = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c_fin.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[test]
fn extra_initial_invalid_cid() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c_init = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let c_init2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(c_init.is_some() && c_init2.is_some());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c_init.unwrap(), now);
let s_init = server.process(c_init2, now).dgram();
assert!(s_init.is_some());
let s_hs = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
// If the client receives a packet that contains the wrong connection
// ID, it won't send another Initial.
let mut copy = s_hs.to_vec();
assert_ne!(copy[5], 0); // The DCID should be non-zero length.
copy[6] ^= 0xc4;
let dgram_copy = Datagram::new(s_hs.destination(), s_hs.source(), s_hs.tos(), copy);
let nothing = client.process(Some(dgram_copy), now).dgram();
assert!(nothing.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn connect_one_version() {
fn connect_v(version: Version) {
fixture_init();
let mut client = Connection::new_client(
test_fixture::DEFAULT_SERVER_NAME,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
DEFAULT_ADDR,
DEFAULT_ADDR,
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(version, vec![version]),
now(),
)
.unwrap();
let mut server = Connection::new_server(
test_fixture::DEFAULT_KEYS,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(version, vec![version]),
)
.unwrap();
connect_force_idle(&mut client, &mut server);
assert_eq!(client.version(), version);
assert_eq!(server.version(), version);
}
for v in Version::all() {
println!("Connecting with {v:?}");
connect_v(v);
}
}
#[test]
fn anti_amplification() {
// This test has its own logic for generating large CRYPTO frames, so turn off MLKEM.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().mlkem(false));
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
// With a gigantic transport parameter, the server is unable to complete
// the handshake within the amplification limit.
let very_big = TransportParameter::Bytes(vec![0; Pmtud::default_plpmtu(DEFAULT_ADDR.ip()) * 3]);
server
.set_local_tparam(TestTransportParameter, very_big)
.unwrap();
let c_init = client.process_output(now).dgram();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init1 = server.process(c_init, now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s_init1.len(), server.plpmtu());
let s_init2 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s_init2.len(), server.plpmtu());
let s_init3 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s_init3.len(), server.plpmtu());
let cb = server.process_output(now).callback();
// We are blocked by the amplification limit now.
assert_eq!(cb, server.conn_params.get_idle_timeout());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s_init1, now);
client.process_input(s_init2, now);
let ack_count = client.stats().frame_tx.ack;
let frame_count = client.stats().frame_tx.all();
let ack = client.process(Some(s_init3), now).dgram().unwrap();
assert!(!maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); // No need yet.
// The client sends a padded datagram, with just ACKs for Initial and Handshake.
// Per RFC 9000 Section 14.1, datagrams containing Initial packets must be
// at least 1200 bytes, even when coalesced with Handshake packets.
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ack, ack_count + 2);
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.all(), frame_count + 2);
assert_eq!(ack.len(), client.plpmtu()); // Must be padded (contains Initial).
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let remainder = server.process(Some(ack), now).dgram();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(remainder.unwrap(), now);
assert!(maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); // OK, we have all of it.
let fin = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
server.process_input(fin.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
#[test]
fn garbage_initial() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram().unwrap();
let (initial, rest) = split_datagram(&dgram);
let mut corrupted = Vec::from(&initial[..initial.len() - 1]);
corrupted.push(initial[initial.len() - 1] ^ 0xb7);
corrupted.extend_from_slice(rest.as_ref().map_or(&[], |r| &r[..]));
let garbage = datagram(corrupted);
assert_eq!(Output::None, server.process(Some(garbage), now()));
}
#[test]
fn drop_initial_packet_from_wrong_address() {
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process_output(now());
let out2 = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some() && out2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let mut server = default_server();
server.process_input(out.dgram().unwrap(), now());
let out = server.process(out2.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let p = out.dgram().unwrap();
let dgram = Datagram::new(
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2)), 443),
p.destination(),
p.tos(),
&p[..],
);
let out = client.process(Some(dgram), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn drop_handshake_packet_from_wrong_address() {
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process_output(now());
let out2 = client.process_output(now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some() && out2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let mut server = default_server();
server.process_input(out.dgram().unwrap(), now());
let out = server.process(out2.dgram(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let (s_in, s_hs) = split_datagram(&out.dgram().unwrap());
// Pass the initial packet to the client.
client.process_input(s_in, now());
// The server packet might be all Initial. If it is, then ask for another one.
let s_hs = s_hs.unwrap_or_else(|| {
let dgram = server.process_output(now()).dgram();
let (s_in, s_hs) = split_datagram(&dgram.unwrap());
// Let the client process any Initial, then keep the Handshake packet.
if let Some(s_hs) = s_hs {
client.process_input(s_in, now());
s_hs
} else {
s_in // This is Handshake, not Initial
}
});
// Let the client acknowledge the packet(s) it received.
drop(client.process_output(now()));
let dgram = Datagram::new(
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2)), 443),
s_hs.destination(),
s_hs.tos(),
&s_hs[..],
);
let out = client.process(Some(dgram), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn ech() {
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client.client_enable_ech(server.ech_config()).unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(client.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
assert!(server.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn ech_no_partial_ech_behavior_on_invalid_config() {
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
let ech_config = server.ech_config().to_vec();
let invalid_ech_config = ech_config[..ech_config.len() - 1].to_vec();
client
.client_enable_ech(invalid_ech_config)
.expect_err("client ignores invalid ECH config");
// Establish a non-ECH connection.
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
// Expect the server to be able to create a stream to the client.
// This checks that the client did not fall back to a partial ECH handshake,
// ensuring all required transport parameters (such as `InitialMaxStreamsBidi`)
// were present in the non-ECH ClientHello.
server.stream_create(StreamType::BiDi).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn ech_retry() {
fixture_init();
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client
.client_enable_ech(damage_ech_config(server.ech_config()))
.unwrap();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let dgram2 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
let dgram = server.process(dgram2, now()).dgram();
let dgram = client.process(dgram, now()).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now()).dgram();
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
let auth_event = ConnectionEvent::EchFallbackAuthenticationNeeded {
public_name: String::from(ECH_PUBLIC_NAME),
};
assert!(client.events().any(|e| e == auth_event));
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::Ok, now());
assert!(client.state().error().is_some());
// Tell the server about the error.
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(
server.state().error(),
Some(&CloseReason::Transport(Error::Peer(0x100 + 121)))
);
let Some(CloseReason::Transport(Error::EchRetry(updated_config))) = client.state().error()
else {
panic!(
"Client state should be failed with EchRetry, is {:?}",
client.state()
);
};
let mut server = default_server();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client.client_enable_ech(updated_config).unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(client.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
assert!(server.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn ech_retry_fallback_rejected() {
fixture_init();
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client
.client_enable_ech(damage_ech_config(server.ech_config()))
.unwrap();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let dgram2 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
let dgram = server.process(dgram2, now()).dgram();
let dgram = client.process(dgram, now()).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now()).dgram();
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
let auth_event = ConnectionEvent::EchFallbackAuthenticationNeeded {
public_name: String::from(ECH_PUBLIC_NAME),
};
assert!(client.events().any(|e| e == auth_event));
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::PolicyRejection, now());
assert!(client.state().error().is_some());
if let Some(CloseReason::Transport(Error::EchRetry(_))) = client.state().error() {
panic!("Client should not get EchRetry error");
}
// Pass the error on.
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(
server.state().error(),
Some(&CloseReason::Transport(Error::Peer(298)))
); // A bad_certificate alert.
}
#[test]
fn bad_min_ack_delay() {
const EXPECTED_ERROR: CloseReason = CloseReason::Transport(Error::TransportParameter);
let mut server = default_server();
let max_ad = u64::try_from(DEFAULT_LOCAL_ACK_DELAY.as_micros()).unwrap();
server
.set_local_tparam(MinAckDelay, TransportParameter::Integer(max_ad + 1))
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let dgram2 = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
let dgram = server.process(dgram2, now()).dgram();
let dgram = client.process(dgram, now()).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now()).dgram();
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::Ok, now());
assert_eq!(client.state().error(), Some(&EXPECTED_ERROR));
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(
server.state().error(),
Some(&CloseReason::Transport(Error::Peer(
Error::TransportParameter.code()
)))
);
}
/// Ensure that the client probes correctly if it only receives Initial packets
/// from the server.
#[test]
fn only_server_initial() {
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut now = now();
let client_dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let client_dgram2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
// Now fetch two flights of messages from the server.
server.process_input(client_dgram.unwrap(), now);
let server_initial1 = server.process(client_dgram2, now).dgram().unwrap();
let server_handshake1 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
let server_initial2 = server.process_output(now + AT_LEAST_PTO).dgram().unwrap();
let _server_handshake2 = server.process_output(now + AT_LEAST_PTO).dgram().unwrap();
// The client sends an Initial ACK.
let (s_init_1, s_hs_1) = split_datagram(&server_initial1);
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ack, 0);
let probe = client.process(Some(s_init_1), now).dgram();
assert_initial(&probe.unwrap(), false);
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ack, 1);
// The same happens after a PTO.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let (s_init_2, _s_hs_2) = split_datagram(&server_initial2);
let probe = client.process(Some(s_init_2), now).dgram();
assert_initial(&probe.unwrap(), false);
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ack, 2);
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
// Pass the Handshake packet(s) and complete the handshake.
if let Some(s_hs_1) = s_hs_1 {
client.process_input(s_hs_1, now);
}
client.process_input(server_handshake1, now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now).dgram();
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
// Collect a few spare Initial packets as the handshake is exchanged.
// Later, replay those packets to see if they result in additional probes; they should not.
#[test]
fn no_extra_probes_after_confirmed() {
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut now = now();
// First, collect a client Initial.
let spare_initial = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let spare_initial2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(spare_initial.is_some() && spare_initial2.is_some());
// Collect ANOTHER client Initial.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let dgram1 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
_ = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let (replay_initial, _) = split_datagram(dgram1.as_ref().unwrap());
// Finally, run the handshake.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO * 2;
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);
let dgram = server.process(dgram2, now).dgram();
// The server should have dropped the Initial keys now, so passing in the Initial
// should elicit a retransmit rather than having it completely ignored.
let spare_handshake = server.process(Some(replay_initial), now).dgram();
assert!(spare_handshake.is_some());
let dgram = client.process(dgram, now).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now).dgram();
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram, now).dgram();
client.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
let probe = server.process(spare_initial, now).dgram();
assert!(probe.is_none());
let probe = client.process(spare_handshake, now).dgram();
assert!(probe.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn implicit_rtt_server() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut now = now();
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram2 = client.process_output(now).dgram();
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(dgram.unwrap(), now);
let dgram = server.process(dgram2, now).dgram().unwrap();
let dgram2 = server.process_output(now).dgram();
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(dgram, now);
let dgram = client.process(dgram2, now).dgram();
let (initial, handshake) = split_datagram(dgram.as_ref().unwrap());
assert_initial(&initial, false);
assert_handshake(handshake.as_ref().unwrap());
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(initial, now);
// The server doesn't receive any acknowledgments, but it can infer
// an RTT estimate from having discarded the Initial packet number space.
assert_eq!(server.stats().rtt, RTT);
}
#[test]
fn emit_authentication_needed_once() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = Connection::new_server(
test_fixture::LONG_CERT_KEYS,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
// Disable pacing to allow sending multiple packets without inter-packet delays.
ConnectionParameters::default().pacing(false),
)
.expect("create a server");
let client1 = client.process_output(now());
let client2 = client.process_output(now());
assert!(client1.as_dgram_ref().is_some() && client2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// The entire server flight doesn't fit in a single packet because the
// certificate is large, therefore the server will produce 2 packets.
_ = server.process(client1.dgram(), now());
let server1 = server.process(client2.dgram(), now());
assert!(server1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let server2 = server.process_output(now());
assert!(server2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let server3 = server.process_output(now());
assert!(server3.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let authentication_needed_count = |client: &mut Connection| {
client
.events()
.filter(|e| matches!(e, ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded))
.count()
};
// Upon receiving the first two packet, the client has the server certificate,
// but not yet all required handshake data. It moves to
// `HandshakeState::AuthenticationPending` and emits a
// `ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded` event.
//
// Note that this is a tiny bit fragile in that it depends on having a certificate
// that is within a fairly narrow range of sizes. It has to fit in a single
// packet, but be large enough that the CertificateVerify message does not
// also fit in the same packet. Our default test setup achieves this, but
// changes to the setup might invalidate this test.
_ = client.process(server1.dgram(), now());
_ = client.process(server2.dgram(), now());
assert_eq!(1, authentication_needed_count(&mut client));
assert!(client.peer_certificate().is_some());
// The `AuthenticationNeeded` event is still pending a call to
// `Connection::authenticated`. On receiving the second packet from the
// server, the client must not emit a another
// `ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded`.
_ = client.process(server3.dgram(), now());
assert_eq!(0, authentication_needed_count(&mut client));
}
#[test]
fn client_initial_retransmits_identical() {
let mut now = now();
// Disable pacing so the PTO timer is the only callback, simplifying assertions.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().pacing(false));
// Force the client to retransmit its Initial flight a number of times and make sure the
// retranmissions are identical to the original. Also, verify the PTO durations.
for i in 1..=5 {
let ci = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(ci.len(), client.plpmtu());
let ci2 = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(ci2.len(), client.plpmtu());
assert_eq!(
client.stats().frame_tx,
FrameStats {
crypto: 3 * i,
..Default::default()
}
);
let pto = client.process_output(now).callback();
assert_eq!(pto, DEFAULT_RTT * 3 * (1 << (i - 1)));
now += pto;
}
}
#[test]
fn client_initial_pto_matches_custom_initial_rtt() {
let custom_initial_rtt = Duration::from_millis(500);
let now = now();
let mut client = new_client(
ConnectionParameters::default()
.initial_rtt(custom_initial_rtt)
.pacing(false),
);
let ci = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(ci.len(), client.plpmtu());
let ci2 = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(ci2.len(), client.plpmtu());
assert_eq!(
client.stats().frame_tx,
FrameStats {
crypto: 3,
..Default::default()
}
);
let pto = client.process_output(now).callback();
assert_eq!(pto, custom_initial_rtt * 3);
}
#[test]
fn server_initial_retransmits_identical() {
let mut now = now();
// We calculate largest_acked, which is difficult with packet number randomization.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().randomize_first_pn(false));
let ci = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
let ci2 = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
// Force the server to retransmit its Initial flight a number of times and make sure the
// retranmissions are identical to the original. Also, verify the PTO durations.
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().pacing(false));
server.process_input(ci, now);
server.process_input(ci2, now);
let mut total_ptos = Duration::from_secs(0);
// Count for any extra packets in each flight due to coalescing.
let mut extra = 0;
for i in 1..=3 {
println!("==== iteration {i} ====");
let d1 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
if let (_, Some(dh)) = split_datagram(&d1) {
extra += usize::from(dh[0] & 0b1011_0000 == 0b1010_0000); // count extra Handshake
}
let d2 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
extra += usize::from(d2[0] & 0b1011_0000 == 0b1001_0000); // count extra Initial
assert_eq!(
server.stats().frame_tx,
FrameStats {
// base count for CRYPTO is two per flight, plus any extra
crypto: i * 2 + extra,
ack: i,
largest_acknowledged: (i - i.saturating_sub(1)) as u64,
..Default::default()
}
);
let pto = server.process_output(now).callback();
now += pto;
total_ptos += pto;
}
// Server is amplification-limited now.
let pto = server.process_output(now).callback();
assert_eq!(
pto,
server
.conn_params
.get_idle_timeout()
.checked_sub(total_ptos)
.expect("doesn't underflow")
);
}
#[test]
fn grease_quic_bit_transport_parameter() {
fn get_remote_tp(conn: &Connection) -> bool {
conn.tps
.borrow()
.remote_handshake()
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.get_empty(GreaseQuicBit)
}
for client_grease in [true, false] {
for server_grease in [true, false] {
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().grease(client_grease));
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().grease(server_grease));
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert_eq!(client_grease, get_remote_tp(&server));
assert_eq!(server_grease, get_remote_tp(&client));
}
}
}
#[test]
fn zero_rtt_with_ech() {
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client.client_enable_ech(server.ech_config()).unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
let token = exchange_ticket(&mut client, &mut server, now());
let mut client = default_client();
client.client_enable_ech(server.ech_config()).unwrap();
client
.enable_resumption(now(), token)
.expect("should set token");
let mut server = resumed_server(&client);
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().early_data_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().early_data_accepted());
}
#[test]
fn scone() {
fn add_scone(d: &Datagram) -> Datagram {
const SCONE: &[u8] = &[0xff, 0x6f, 0x7d, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0x00, 0x00];
let mut sconed = SCONE.to_vec();
sconed.extend_from_slice(&d[..]);
Datagram::new(d.source(), d.destination(), d.tos(), sconed)
}
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().scone(true));
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().scone(true));
let ci = client.process_output(now()).dgram().unwrap();
let ci_len = ci.len();
assert_eq!(
&ci[ci_len - Connection::SCONE_INDICATION.len()..],
Connection::SCONE_INDICATION,
"Client should send indication"
);
server.process_input(ci, now());
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tps.borrow_mut().remote().get_empty(Scone));
assert!(server.tps.borrow_mut().remote().get_empty(Scone));
let client_stats = client.stats();
let server_stats = server.stats();
let d = send_something(&mut client, now());
server.process_input(add_scone(&d), now());
let d = send_something(&mut server, now());
client.process_input(add_scone(&d), now());
// The SCONE packets are effectively invisible.
assert_eq!(server.stats().packets_rx, server_stats.packets_rx + 1);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, client_stats.packets_rx + 1);
}
/// RFC 9287 Section 3.1 states: "A server MUST NOT remember that a client negotiated
/// the extension in a previous connection and set the QUIC Bit to 0 based on that information."
///
/// This test verifies that the client complies with RFC 9287 Section 3.1 by ensuring
/// it does not grease the QUIC Bit based on cached (0-RTT) transport parameters.
/// Regression test for the `handshakeloss` interop test failure, where client Initial
/// packets with the fixed bit cleared (due to cached parameters) were discarded by the server.
#[test]
fn grease_quic_bit_respects_current_handshake() {
fixture_init();
// Create a client connection.
let client = Connection::new_client(
test_fixture::DEFAULT_SERVER_NAME,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(EmptyConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
DEFAULT_ADDR,
DEFAULT_ADDR,
ConnectionParameters::default(),
now(),
)
.unwrap();
// Simulate having cached 0-RTT transport parameters that include grease_quic_bit.
// In reality, this would come from a previous connection's session ticket.
let mut tp = crate::tparams::TransportParameters::default();
tp.set_empty(GreaseQuicBit);
client.tps.borrow_mut().set_remote_0rtt(Some(tp));
// At this point:
// - We have remote_0rtt params with GreaseQuicBit
// - We do NOT have remote_handshake params (no current handshake confirmation)
// With only cached 0-RTT params, no greasing is allowed.
assert!(
!client.can_grease_quic_bit(),
"Must not grease with only cached 0-RTT params (RFC 9287 Section 3.1)"
);
}
#[test]
fn certificate_compression() {
use std::sync::Mutex;
use neqo_crypto::agent::CertificateCompressor;
// These statics work for concurrent test execution because the certificate is
// effectively a fixed value. A more robust approach would use a hash-based lookup,
// but that's unnecessary given the current test setup.
static ORIGINAL: Mutex<Vec<u8>> = Mutex::new(Vec::new());
static DECODED: Mutex<Vec<u8>> = Mutex::new(Vec::new());
struct Xor;
impl CertificateCompressor for Xor {
const ID: u16 = 0x1234;
const NAME: &std::ffi::CStr = c"xor";
const ENABLE_ENCODING: bool = true;
fn decode(input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) -> neqo_crypto::Res<()> {
output
.iter_mut()
.zip(input)
.for_each(|(o, &i)| *o = i ^ 0xAA);
*DECODED.lock().unwrap() = output[..input.len()].to_vec();
Ok(())
}
fn encode(input: &[u8], output: &mut [u8]) -> neqo_crypto::Res<usize> {
*ORIGINAL.lock().unwrap() = input.to_vec();
output
.iter_mut()
.zip(input)
.for_each(|(o, &i)| *o = i ^ 0xAA);
Ok(input.len())
}
}
let mut client = default_client();
client.set_certificate_compression::<Xor>().unwrap();
let mut server = default_server();
server.set_certificate_compression::<Xor>().unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(!ORIGINAL.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert_eq!(*ORIGINAL.lock().unwrap(), *DECODED.lock().unwrap());
}
/// Test that Initial CRYPTO can be retransmitted even when PTO fires for Handshake space.
///
/// This reproduces the bug from QNS L1/C1 test failures where:
/// 1. Client sends `ClientHello` split across multiple Initial packets
/// 2. Server receives first packet but second is lost
/// 3. Server ACKs what it received
/// 4. Client detects loss and retransmits, but packets keep getting lost
/// 5. Initial PTO fires, which primes the Handshake PTO timer
/// 6. Handshake PTO fires
/// 7. BUG: `ack_only(Initial)` returns true, blocking CRYPTO retransmission
/// 8. Client cannot complete handshake, times out
///
/// RFC 9002 Section 6.2.4 requires sending probes in packet number spaces
/// with in-flight data. The client must be able to retransmit lost Initial
/// CRYPTO frames even when PTO fires for Handshake space.
#[test]
fn initial_crypto_retransmit_during_handshake_pto() {
let mut now = now();
// Use default client which has MLKEM enabled, causing CRYPTO to be split
// across multiple Initial packets.
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().pacing(false));
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().pacing(false));
// Client sends Initial packets. With MLKEM, this will be 2 packets.
let c_init_1 = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
let c_init_2 = client.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_initial(&c_init_1, false);
assert_initial(&c_init_2, false);
// Record the initial CRYPTO frame count. With default settings (MLKEM + SNI slicing),
// the ClientHello is split: 2 CRYPTO frames in the first packet, 1 in the second.
let crypto_before = client.stats().frame_tx.crypto;
assert_eq!(crypto_before, 3);
// Deliver only the FIRST Initial packet to server. The second is "lost".
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
server.process_input(c_init_1, now);
// Server sends ACK for what it received (incomplete ClientHello).
// Server is waiting for more CRYPTO data to complete the ClientHello.
let s_ack = server.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(s_ack.is_some(), "Server should ACK the partial Initial");
// Deliver server's ACK to client.
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(s_ack.unwrap(), now);
// Client should detect that c_init_2 was lost (server ACKed c_init_1 but not c_init_2).
// The client is now in a state where:
// - It has received an Initial ACK (knows peer is alive)
// - It still has lost Initial CRYPTO data to retransmit
// - Handshake space may get primed for PTO
// Fire PTOs multiple times. Without further ACKs, the PTO mechanism must
// continue to allow CRYPTO retransmission even when Handshake PTO fires.
//
// The bug manifests when:
// 1. Initial PTO fires, priming Handshake PTO
// 2. Handshake PTO fires (before Initial PTO, since Initial keeps sending)
// 3. Without the fix: Initial packets aren't marked for retransmission, and ack_only(Initial)
// blocks CRYPTO frames
for pto_count in 1..=5 {
now += client.process_output(now).callback();
let crypto_before_pto = client.stats().frame_tx.crypto;
// Collect all packets sent on this PTO.
let mut packets_sent = 0;
while client.process_output(now).dgram().is_some() {
packets_sent += 1;
}
let crypto_after_pto = client.stats().frame_tx.crypto;
// The client MUST send packets on PTO.
assert!(
packets_sent > 0,
"PTO {pto_count}: Client should send packets on PTO"
);
// The client MUST include CRYPTO frames, not just PINGs/ACKs.
assert!(
crypto_after_pto > crypto_before_pto,
"PTO {pto_count}: Client must retransmit CRYPTO frames, not just ACKs/PINGs. \
CRYPTO frames before: {crypto_before_pto}, after: {crypto_after_pto}, \
packets sent: {packets_sent}"
);
}
}